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Introduction
Mortgage markets currently present two interesting analytical issues. The first is that, at the international level, there is a housing price boom in the United States (including New York, San Francisco and Seattle), Australia (Sydney), Great Britain (London), and Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), among other countries. 1 This trend, which so far has extended from 1995 to 2004, invites us to rethink the following housing-related issues: 1) households' consumption/savings function;
2) housing as a preferred asset compared to financial savings or equity; and 3) the role of central banks in "asset inflation," particularly under inflationtargeting regimes.
A further issue relates to Colombia, where a construction recovery cycle (2003) (2004) followed a major macroeconomic contraction of 4.3 percent in 1999, which involved a foreign exchange and mortgage crises that lasted from 1998 to 2001. This recovery remains weak, however, since it is not yet based on mortgage credit. The ratio of mortgage credit to GDP is currently as low as 5 percent, down from a historical peak of 12 percent during the mid 1990s.
Colombia's housing recovery stems mainly from capital inflows, the result of arbitrage in favor of Latin American markets with respect to U.S. markets, and significant increases in remittances from Colombians living abroad. 2 We estimate that the combined effect of these two forces has increased disposable income by as much as 1 percent of GDP over 2003-2004, and helps explain why the construction sector's annual average real rate of growth (about 12 percent)
is triple that of the economy as a whole (close to 4 percent). If capital flows were to be reversed because of additional increases in the U.S. market interest rate differential, the construction recovery in Colombia could be in jeopardy.
This paper provides an overview of the housing system in Colombia and explores its socioeconomic and financial determinants. We also estimate a simultaneous econometric model for the housing market in Colombia using quarterly data over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . On the demand side, we find that the area of approved licenses is highly elastic to households'
1 See IMF (2003); Merrill Lynch (2004); Economist (2004b) . 2 See Banco de la República (2004a) . disposable income, new housing prices, and real interest rates on mortgage credit. On the supply side, we find high input-cost elasticity and a moderate response to wealth effects. These results prove to be robust to different proxies and diverse estimation procedures.
Section 2 makes international comparisons among mortgage regimes and discusses several features of the Colombian system, which is characterized by low mortgage-credit deepening and real interest rate ceilings. These ceilings were ordered by the Constitutional Court as a result of the social unrest caused by the flex-nominal system that prevailed during the 1993-1998 period. Section 3 focuses on the features of the Colombian housing and mortgage system, while Section 4 develops and estimates a simultaneous econometric model for housing in
Colombia over the period 1991-2004 using quarterly data. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Mortgage Systems: An International Comparison

Housing Price Cycles in Some Developed Economies
House prices behave differently across and within countries, depending on economic cycles, capital markets, and local regulations dealing with land availability and environmental requirements. Take the case of Japan, where house prices declined by 19 percent in real terms nationwide and 32 percent in Tokyo over the period 1995-2002 (see Table 1 ). In spite of this decline, an apartment of 100 mts 2 in Tokyo still cost about US$850,000 in 2002, while the average price in the rest of Japan was close to US$300,000.
3
In the United States, on the other hand, there has been a pronounced upward housing price cycle, particularly over the years [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The average nationwide house-price increase was close to 27 percent in real terms, and in New York it was 47 percent in real terms. 4 The typical 100 mts 2 New York apartment cost almost one million dollars, not much above the price of a similar apartment in Tokyo after prices collapsed. 5 More recently, American housing price inflation quickened during 2004, while the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has been increasing the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) at a "measured pace" from 1 percent to 2 percent during the second half of 2004. While it is still too soon to say whether the pace of FFR increases will succeed in 3 See Collyns and Senhadji (2003) on housing-price cycles in Asia.. 4 Economist (2003a, p.6 2003-2004. 7 The situation is likely to worsen because the Central Bank of Spain has delegated the conduct of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB has maintained the repo rate at 2 percent, since core inflation seems to be under control in the European Union (EU), but this general policy is of little help in containing asset-price inflation in Spain. It might be appropriate for Germany, however, where housing prices continued to fall in real terms during 2004. Furthermore, we will see that it is not only real interest rates close to zero that fuel housing prices in Spain, but the mortgage system as a whole, which features minimal down payments and long amortization horizons.
The typical apartment of 100 mts 2 in Madrid, however, still costs about half that of its counterpart in New York, London, or Tokyo, where land scarcity and stringent regulations play an important role in housing price formation. Interestingly, transaction costs differ significantly, with no particular rule: in New York and Madrid they run high at 12 percent of commercial value, while in London and Tokyo they seem moderate at 4 or 5 percent (see Table 1 ). 6 Merrill Lynch (2004); Economist (2004d) . 7 See Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004, p. 67); Economist (2004d) . there is still a risk of a bust.
Mortgage Systems
The economic theory of housing demand assigns crucial importance to credit and the ways in which it is provided or rationed. 8 Hence it is important to understand different mortgage systems and international practices. Case (2000) , p.132. 12 See Urrutia (2000) and Clavijo (2004) . In the U.S. economy, real interest rates on mortgages have hovered at around 3 to 5 percent in the 2000-2004 period. Consequently, the risk of a boom-bust cycle in the U.S.
economy is more closely related to housing price volatility than to interest rate volatility. 13 In fact, a mistake in efforts to "prick the bubble" might set in motion a housing price collapse that would leave households with a high loan-to-value ratio (that is, mortgage credit/house value), and financial entities could then experience a significant increase in their non-performing loans (NPL) portfolio.
14 A third characteristic of the U.S. system is that tax breaks are not limited to special treatments in direct/indirect taxes. Quasi-public banks pass on to mortgage creditors a benefit that has been estimated at between 25-50 basis points; this benefit represents an additional tax break of 8 to 10 percent of current market interest rates.
The U.S. mortgage system has provided a benchmark worldwide. The United Kingdom, for instance, has been studying ways in which some of this refinancing process could be replicated in order to further empower monetary policy by moving from a flexible interest rate system to a fixed rate system. No definite approach has been chosen, however, and real interest rates in the United Kingdom's mortgage system currently stand at 4 to 6 percent. In addition to being slightly above U.S. rates, these are more volatile.
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13 See Caplin, Freeman and Tracy (1997); and Shostak (2004) . 14 A boom-bust cycle is certainly a risk that is currently facing Australia; see Merrill Lynch (2004) . 15 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997 After the 1998-1999 financial crises, Colombia adopted a peculiar fixed-real interest rate mortgage system. Although such a system allows for pre-payments at no additional cost, the lack of sufficient competition among mortgage banks and high delinquency rates-hovering around 20-25 percent during 2000-2003-have maintained real interest lending rates at rather high levels of 8-13 percent annually (see Table 2 Table 3 illustrates the expected macroeconomic effects of systems with fixed and flexible mortgage interest rates, respectively. As discussed above, under a fixed system a downward trend in market interest rates sets in motion a refinancing process that usually boosts aggregate demand, with a more lasting effect than under a flexible system. Under a flexible system, on the 16 Economist (2003a) . 17 See Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) . 18 For more details on economic Constitutional Court rulings, see Clavijo (2001) .
other hand, responses are more rapidly absorbed by the economy but they show less resilience and more volatility. On the other hand, a flexible system helps to avoid the problem of mismatches between assets and liabilities. In Chile and Colombia mortgage interest rates have been traditionally indexed to CPIs, both on the asset and liability sides, so that inflation volatility would not affect the balance sheet performance. As inflation has been reduced from annual levels of 30-32 percent to 3-6 percent since the beginning of the 1990s, credit markets in Chile and Colombia have undergone a re-nominalization process (Fuentes et al., 2003) .
Fixed-rate mortgage systems have been accompanied by the development of quasi-public banks that carry out the securitizations of long-term mortgages, as in the case of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in the United States. In developing economies there seems to be greater scope for private sector developments in regard to securitization markets. There is an ongoing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of each system, since no country seems to be completely satisfied with its existing institutional arrangement. The United Kingdom has recently analyzed the possibility of deepening the fixed-rate component of its system, but no definite strategy has been adopted. In the United States, as discussed above, concerns have been raised about cashing out house valorizations that could prove only temporary.
19
19 See Brady, Canner and Maki (2000) .
Ownership Rates
Let us define households' ownership rate as the ratio of homeowners to the number of properties.
This indicator is usually drawn from household surveys. In the United States, this rate has increased from 66 percent in the mid 1990s to 68 percent in the early 2000s (see Table 4 ). A similar trend has been observed in the United Kingdom and Spain, where ownership has reached even higher levels of 70 to 80 percent. The EU average, however, is much lower, at 61 percent.
In Germany, about 40 percent of the population live in rented housing, and a similar pattern is evident in the Nordic countries. Thus not all developed economies have high ownership rates, as is usually believed. Nevertheless, housing accounts for most household wealth. In the United
States, for instance, housing represents between one third and one half of net wealth.
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Consequently, a change in housing prices alters perceptions of wealth more significantly than does a change in stocks' valuations.
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In developing economies, the World Bank reports that "secure ownership tenancy" is quite high, at 90 to 100 percent. 22 This seems odd in light of these countries' informality, lack of ownership titles, and difficulties in carrying out the rule of law. 23 In fact, one would expect ownership rates in developing economies to be much lower than in developed economies. 
The Housing Sector in Colombia
Macroeconomic Impact
The relative importance of the construction sector in the Colombian economy is summarized in Table 5 , which shows that housing and public works have accounted for about 5 to 7 percent of GDP in recent decades. More recently, and as a result of the 1998-1999 housing crisis, the construction sector's share of GDP has declined to 5.2 percent despite the 2002-2004 recovery; the sector has posted real growth rates of 6 to 9 percent annually. The housing sector alone represents only about 3 percent of GDP, approximately half of the share usually observed in many developed economies. Housing sector jobs account for 5 to 6 percent of total employment, and the sector has considerable potential to absorb unskilled workers. While it has a low-level wage structure, the housing sector nonetheless benefits from a very flexible labor market.
24 See Szalachman (2000); and IDB (2004) . 25 UNDP (2003) . 26 See Gilbert (2001) and IDB (2004). Szalachman (2000) .
of around 26.5 percent and the overcrowding rate of nearly 15 percent, the conclusion is that about 45 percent of the population lives in unhealthy housing (see Table 5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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Financial Returns on Housing
Financial returns on housing depend crucially on house-price fluctuations, which in turn affect the cost of renting. Lease-fees are determined by:
1. the economic cycle, which alters the lease-fee/home-value ratio in ranges that have fluctuated between 0.7 percent and 1.2 percent monthly in Colombia in the last two decades;
2. the structure of tax breaks related to mortgage credit versus lease-payments; and 3. the difference between housing-financial returns and other portfolios, where liquidity plays a key role. Table 6 shows the financial return from renting a house in Bogotá over the period 1995-2002, after maintenance and property taxes. 36 In view of the value loss of about 37 percent that occurred during that period (see Figure 2 ), the conclusion is that the net financial return on home ownership was close to zero in real terms during the period 1995-2002. This result is quite poor 34 More details are available in Banco de la República (2003, p. 41) . 35 House-value losses were about 34 percent in Medellin, 35 percent in Cali and 32 percent in Barranquilla. The weighted average real value-loss in the main cities has been estimated at 37 percent during 1996-2002, using weights of 50 percent for Bogotá, 20 percent for Medellin, 20 percent for Cali and 10 percent for Barranquilla. Housing-price series were constructed in our branch offices and are available upon request. 36 We followed the standard methodology where: House-Financial Return = [Monthly Lease-Fee -Maintenance Costs -Property Taxes] + House Valorizations, as explained in Muellbauer and Murphy (1997 , pp. 1702 -1707 .
when contrasted with the real annual return of 7 percent in the United States, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, or 21 percent in Spain over the period 1995-2002, as seen in Table 4 .
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The prospects for Bogotá have improved recently (Fedesarrollo, 2004) , as lease-fees are now close to 0.9 percent of the monthly house-market value. House valorizations are up about 10 percent in real terms per annum during the period 2002-2004. As a result, housing-financial returns now range from between 5.5 percent to 9.1 percent in real terms annually, as shown in Table 6 .
37 See Economist (2002b, p.11; 2004c, p. 68) . 
The Mortgage System in Colombia
Regulated by Law 546 of 1999, Colombia's mortgage system is defined by the following main characteristics: 3. high real mortgage-interest rates at 9 to 13 percent annually, which are regulated by ceiling rates set by the Constitutional Court and carried out by the Central Bank. These rates currently stand at 11 percent for social housing and 13.9 percent for other housing. This highly regulated environment has resulted from the real estate crises of recent years, whose legacies include still-high NPL indicators, currently at 11 percent, and declining mortgage credit, which presently represents only 5 percent of GDP.
Nevertheless, interesting financial developments have sought to cut financial costs and boost demand for housing credit. Several mortgage banks have moved to offer fixed nominal interest rates, avoiding the traditional CPI indexation of mortgage credits. In order to cover peso denomination risk, these institutions have maintained in their asset portfolios significant amounts of local CPI-linked treasury bills. The deepening of the local public-debt market since the mid 1990s has helped create a medium-term "yield-curve" for the recently-created Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) in the Colombian-market, which currently has a portfolio close to 1 percent of GDP.
38 This is the aftermath cost of the Asian crisis, as related in Cárdenas and Badel (2003, p. 53) , Tenjo and López (2003, p. 171) , and Herrera and Perry (2003, p. 153) . 39 See Cuellar (2002) and Clavijo (2001 and .
The secondary market demand for MBS could increase as of 2006, when tax exemptions to the pension funds will expire. 40 Local treasuries represent about 30 percent of GDP and have a modified duration of close to 3.5 years. Of this total, the equivalent of nearly 15 percent of GDP are issued at fixed nominal interest rates, and the remainder are CPI-linked (with no significant exchange-rate indexation).
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As inflation in Colombia declines from the current 5-6 percent rate to the medium-term target of 3 percent, announced under the inflation-targeting regime adopted in 2000, mortgagecredit users should reap the huge benefit of a decline in real interest costs from 13.9 percent to a range of 8 to 12 percent in the near future. Consolidation of this cost-reduction, however, requires greater stability in court rulings on mortgage markets and a continuous decline in the NPL indicator, which has slowly fallen from 22 percent at the beginning of the decade to 11 percent in mid 2004.
Finally, it should be noted that Colombia's mortgage system is currently subject to several tax distortions. As shown in Table 2 above, Colombia grants generous direct and indirect tax treatments, including total tax deductions for interest and amortization payments not necessarily linked to mortgage credit. This is a desperate move to bolster the construction sector in the aftermath of the 1998-1999 financial crises. 42 At the margin, and in the early years of the legislation, such tax breaks probably had a positive effect in reviving the construction sector, but they currently represent a huge tax loophole that should soon be corrected to address the country's precarious fiscal situation. 43 Similarly, voluntary pension contributions should stop being treated as five-year personal certificates of deposit; exempt from taxes, these are often later used to access a second round of tax breaks when consumers purchase a house. 40 See Zea (2003, p. 74) . 41 More details in Banco de la República (2004b) . 42 See Law 488 of 1998 and Law 633 of 2000 (Art. 23), which promoted the so-called AFC-accounts, reaching a historical-cumulative value of COP$45 billion in mid-2004 (about 1 percent of the certificate of deposit market). 43 We found that the tax break might not actually compensate for the cost of mortgage credit, thus making the acquisition of property unattractive. In order for a tax break to produce a net positive in purchasing property, it is necessary for asset valorizations to be positive in real terms. A formal demonstration is available upon request.
Econometric Determinants of the Housing Market in Colombia
The fundamental determinants of the housing market in Colombia, paradoxically, have not been explored systematically. 44 In this section we attempt to address this lack of reliable estimates of demand-supply housing functions. These estimates cover quarterly data over the [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] period.
The Basic Model
We follow a standard demand for housing, which can be summarized as in equation (1):
where D H is the demand for housing, is average household real income, y µ is the opportunity cost faced by the prospective buyer, and D is intended to capture other factors that could affect the demand schedule. It is also common to define µ as:
where is the house price, H P r is the real interest rate, δ is the rate of depreciation (or the cost of maintaining the asset, including taxes) and P is the rate of valorization of the asset.
Replacing (2) with (1) yields equation (3), which represents the (linear) function of housing demand in terms of its final price:
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) explain how equation (1) is the result of intertemporal maximization of a consumer's utility function that chooses between two goods: housing and consumption goods. Hence the demand for housing has similar determinants to that for 44 A notorious exception is the study of Fedesarrollo (2004) , where supply-demand-supply functions were estimated. However, the sample-period was rather narrow (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) due to basic-data difficulties, and parameter estimates turned-out to be unstable. 45 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) ; Gallin (2003) ; Mühleisen and Kaufman (2003) , among others, use an inverted demand function, as defined in (3), with the purpose of modeling price-behavior and detecting asset-bubbles. consumption goods, including the vector of other variables represented by D . Such a vector, in turn, refers to future-income expectations and a proxy for households' wealth.
The housing supply function can be modeled as in equation (4): This supply function can be inverted, as in equation (5), to be expressed as a function of housing prices , instead of being a function of quantities
+ -?
At the international level, it is quite common for analysts to concentrate on estimations of housing demand functions and disregard supply functions, given the difficulties of tackling the empirics of supply. Estimates of equation (5) usually appear along with simultaneous estimates of equation (3), such that price equilibrium for the housing market can be found in the context of:
Figure 3 represents equations (3), (4), and (6). Our estimates aim at finding short-term price-quantities changes when components of supply-demand schedules change. If the demand for housing increases in the short run from D1 to D2, one would expect equilibrium prices to increase from E 0 to E 1 . As the supply function responds in the medium term, however, the price increase should be lower, reaching E 2 . The estimations became unreliable when we attempted to include dynamic responses of the supply function, so our following discussion will concentrate on short-term effects.
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46 We used the well-known buffer-stock model, which proved to be rather unstable. Error correction models worked better but still did not prove sufficiently useful to be worth reporting. was taken from national surveys, and the real mortgage-credit cost ( excludes social housing. We assume that depreciation and maintenance costs ) y ) r ) (δ remained constant over the sample period. Different proxies of asset valuations changes were used, linking adaptive and semi-rational expectations. As the econometric significance of these variables was low, however, we discarded them.
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47 See Annex for data used. 48 This implies that we will not be able to capture the substitution effect between new and used housing. Furthermore, such price data relate only to Bogotá. We found, however, that Bogotá's new house price index is a leading indicator for the rest of the main cities. 49 Expected returns on house-valuations were obtained through an AR (1) we included them in (3). Our semi-rational expectations model followed Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) , but none of these estimates proved significant.
In the vector of variables D, in equation (3), we included the rate of unemployment as a proxy of income volatility (Unempl), which turned out to be systematically significant. The wealth effect on households was better captured through a stock-exchange index than through financial asset changes.
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As for the housing-supply function (equations 4 and 5), we used several proxies for capturing house-stock effects ) H ( , but no satisfactory results were obtained. We even constructed a historical stock of available square meters without gaining much statistical significance.
Vector incorporated an index of construction input-cost, financial opportunity cost, and some measurement of quality changes (an attempt to tackle the "hedonic price" problem).
The variables used were, in order, the Camacol construction index cost, the certificate of deposit (CD) real interest rate and non-linear time variables. The demand for housing is relatively elastic to mortgage credit costs, showing an elasticity of -0.36, similar to the interest rate elasticities found in traditional money-demand functions. This gives empirical support to our claim that a housing sector with overly regulated interest rates, such as the ceilings imposed by court rulings, will hamper housing development.
Estimation and Results
One should expect that, as NPL indicators decline over time, mortgage interest rates should fall, in turn causing a natural increase in housing demand. In other words, the provision of additional 50 In fact, the traditional financial deepening indicators (like M3/GDP) were insignificant. 51 See Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) .
housing cannot be pursued through administrative restrictions on mortgage rates. We also found moderate support for wealth effects on housing demand. For instance, a 10 percent increase in stock exchange valuation is associated with a 3 percent increase in demand for housing.
As to the housing supply function, Table 7 reports price elasticity close to one (1.09), which is similar in absolute value to our estimate through the demand function. Input costs, in turn, are highly correlated with supply-price increases; the statistical significance of this correlation, however, is weak. Finally, financial opportunity cost plays a minor role in the supply function (-0.08), although it is consistently significant in statistical terms.
In order to correct our estimations for possible simultaneity bias, and to better characterize both supply and demand sides of the market, we also estimated this system through a Full-Information Maximum-Likelihood method (FIML). 52 In this scenario prices and quantities are estimated in a simultaneous market and are efficient under normality of estimated errors. We inverted the supply function, as in equation (5), and obtained FIML estimates of our supplydemand housing system. 53 Table 8 reports our estimates under FIML, which basically confirm our previous results:
income-price elasticities are high and have the expected signs. Furthermore, during the period under consideration these elasticities increased in absolute terms, reaching 1.5 for income, -1.8
for price, and -1.4 for income volatility (capture through unemployment). The impact of real interest rates on mortgages, however, decreased in absolute terms from -0.36 to -0.28.
Nevertheless, the role of mortgage credit remained quite relevant. It should also be noted that the elasticity of input costs on the supply function remained high (2.28). This leads us to consider the possibility of oligopolistic behavior, which calls for further study at the micro level.
Finally, we found that housing prices behave cyclically, as captured by the quadratic-time component reported in Table 8 . This factor could also be related to quality improvements in housing supply, which affect housing prices in a non-linear manner.
54 52 See Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2000) . 53 Several colleagues commented to us that an alternative might have been to use a set of instrumental variables; however, we found that our FIML-approach, under normality of errors, fulfilled our expectations, having serious database restrictions. 54 This is the case of the US economy, as reported by Mühleisen and Kaufman (2003) , and there is also some evidence in the case of Colombia, as mentioned by Fedesarrollo (2004) . 
Concluding Remarks
We have provided an international overview of housing systems and place Colombia's mortgage system in that context, including an analysis of socioeconomic and financial determinants. Our econometric estimates of the demand for housing in Colombia indicate that the area of approved licenses is highly elastic to households' disposable income, new housing prices, new housing and real interest rates on mortgage credits. On the supply side, we have found a high input-cost elasticity and a moderate response to wealth effects. Our estimates under FIML confirm our results: income price elasticities are high and have the expected signs. 
Data Used in Econometric Estimates for Colombia
